Peer-Reviewed Article

Jurnal Keuangan dan Perbankan
Volume 26, Issue 4 October 2022, page. 917-936
ISSN: 1410-8089 (Print), 2443-2687 (Online)
DOI: 10.26905/jkdp.v26i4.8524

The Time Horizon Of Corporate Governance Effect On Firm Performance: A Study Of Indonesia Financial Industry Firms

Ella Rahayu[1],Yie Ke Feliana[2]
[1,2] *University of Surabaya, Indonesia*
*Corresponding Author: yiekefeliana@staff.ubaya.ac.id

Abstract

Corporate governance is still an important issue today because poor governance can be the cause of business failure. Therefore, good governance is needed to maintain business sustainability. This study aims to examine and analyze the effect of corporate governance, namely the board of commissioners, audit committee and risk monitoring committee on the company's current and long-term performance. In addition, corporate secretary is added as a variable that moderates the influence of the board of commissioners on firm performance. The object of research are financial firms listed on the IDX in 2017-2020. This study found that a qualified corporate secretary can positively moderate the proportion of independent commissioners on the company's current and long-term performance. Audit committee qualifications have a significant positive effect on current and long-term performance. The meeting of the risk monitoring committee has no effect on the firm's performance for the current year but has a significant positive effect on the firm's long-term performance. Considering these results, this study suggests that companies should implement good governance today because it has an impact on firm performance in the future.

Keywords : Corporate Governance; Corporate Secretary; Firm Performance
JEL Classification : G200, G300, G320, M400

This is an open-access article under the CC–BY-SA license

1. INTRODUCTION

Corporate governance is an important issue discussed in the economic crisis that hit Indonesia in 1997-1998. Poor governance in government and private companies is one of the causes of the economic crisis. This crisis made the public realize that global economic conditions and national politics are very uncertain, so that good corporate governance is needed. Until now, corporate governance is still an important issue to discuss because corporate governance can prevent companies from business failure. Such is the case of Enron, which has a wide impact on the global economy. In Indonesia, there are also cases of default experienced by a state-owned financial company, namely PT Asuransi Jiwasraya and PT ASABRI. The case has caused huge losses to both the state and society. The default was caused by corrupt practices under the guise of investment, bribery, and money

laundering by the board of directors and management. Seeing the big case experienced by companies in the financial industry, this study focuses on the financial industry as the object of research.

Based on the causes in that case, a supervisory function of the board of directors is required. The supervisory function of the company is carried out by the board of commissioners. There are some studies on the board of commissioners interacting with the firm performance. Some research in Indonesia, which adopts a two-tier system, provided inconsistent results about the board of commissioners. Darwis (2009) showed that the proportion of independent commissioners and firm performance are not interrelated because the existence of independent commissioners in the companies examined is only a formality. Fadillah (2017) found that an increasing proportion of independent commissioners will cause the firm performance to decrease. Mai (2015), Davinda, Mukhzarudfa, and Zulma (2021) found that board size positively affect firm performance. Several studies on companies with a one-tier board system, have investigated the positive influence of the board on company performance (Farooque, Buachoom, & Sun, 2019; Puni & Anlesinya, 2020; Sheikh & Alom, 2021).

In carrying out its supervisory function, the board of commissioners is assisted by committees under it such as the audit committee and the risk monitoring committee in financial industry. The role of the audit committee is to help ensure that internal controls are implemented properly, financial statements are presented fairly, and audits are carried out according to standards (KNKG, 2006). Several studies found that the audit committee has a significant positive effect on firm performance (Farooque et al., 2019; Musallam, 2020; Alodat, Salleh, & Sulong, 2021). Using Indonesia data, Fuad (2014) did not find the effect of audit committee size on firm performance. Irma (2019) found that the size of the audit committee had a negative effect on firm performance.

The risk monitoring committee plays a role in assessing the tolerance for risk that can be taken and overseeing the risk management implemented (KNKG, 2006). The obligation to form a risk monitoring committee is required in most financial sectors, while in other sectors it is not yet mandatory. Some previous studies found that the risk committee can improve firm performance (Ames, Hines, & Sankara, 2018; Aldhamari, Nor, Boudiab, & Mas’ud, 2020; Wahyuni & Yuniati, 2020).

The inconsistency of existing research on the board of commissioners, audit committees, as well as the lack of research on risk monitoring committees, make this an interesting subject to be raised in research. In addition, considering the results of previous studies that did not find the effect of corporate governance on firm performance in the current year, this study is interested in investigating the effect of governance on long-term firm performance. The underlying reason for this is that the benefits of implementing good corporate governance will be realized in the future. Ames et al. (2018) in his research on the risk committee concluded that the presence of the risk committee is not related to the firm performance in the short term but it takes five years to realize the effect of the presence of the risk committee on future performance.

This study also examines the role of corporate secretary in corporate governance on firm performance. The corporate secretary has a role in governance practices, that is providing advice to the directors and board of commissioners to ensure the company's compliance with applicable regulations and assisting the implementation of good corporate governance (OJK, 2014b). The importance of the role of the corporate secretary has been stated in several previous studies (Wulfsohn, 2014; Peij, Bezemer, & Maassen, 2015; Kakabadse, Khan, & Kakabadse, 2016; Xing, Duan, & Hou, 2017; Vavilina, Kirillova, &

Levanova, 2018; Oneto & Díaz, 2021). However, from the existing research, there are still few studies that link the corporate secretary with company performance. Corporate secretary in this study is positioned as a variable that only moderates the influence of the board of commissioners on firm performance, because the role played by the corporate secretary is related to the board of commissioners, not to the audit committee or risk monitoring committee.

To carry out his role, corporate secretary is required to have expertise that is not only administrative in nature but also in other fields, especially law, finance, and corporate governance (OJK, 2014b). With his expertise, the corporate secretary is expected to be able to provide advice to the board of commissioners and implement good corporate governance. This study will investigate whether a qualified corporate secretary can strengthen the role of the board of commissioners on firm performance.

Besides this study also examine the role risk monitoring committee in firm performance. This committee is only mandatory for financial industry firms, as the object of the current study. This committee has not been studied extensively, compare to other corporate governance mechanism, such as board commissioner, audit committee. Therefore, it is interesting to examine whether this committee has effect on firm performance.

Based on this background, the research objective is to examine the effect of the board of commissioners (as an independent variable or moderated by the corporate secretary), audit committee, and risk monitoring committee on the firm performance in the next few years. The object of this study was financial industry companies that are listed on IDX in 2017-2020.

2. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT

Board of Commissioners Size and Firm Performance

Previous research stated different results about the effect of the size of the board of commissioners on firm performance. According to Jensen (1993) large boards are less effective because of problems in communication and decision making. Osangkul, Treepongkaruna, Jiraporn and Uyar (2021) found that firms tend to reduce board size in response to economic policy uncertainty. Meanwhile, several recent studies have suggested that larger board numbers are positively associated with better firm performance (Mai, 2015; Farooque et al., 2019; Punni & Anlesinya, 2020; Davinda et al., 2021; Sheikh & Alom, 2021; Ramadan & Hassan, 2021). The more member of boards can provide knowledge and experience to supervise managers and help solve problems (Farooque et al., 2019). With direction and supervision from the board of commissioners to the board of directors, it is hoped that the performance of the directors will lead to good firm performance as well. Based on this description, it appears that there are two different results from previous research. On the one hand suggests a negative relationship, on the other hand suggests a positive relationship. Thus, the researcher formulated the first hypothesis without direction:

H1: The size of the board of commissioners affects the firm performance

Proportion of Independent Commissioners and Firm Performance

In the guidelines for implementing good governance, companies are required to have independent commissioners in their board of commissioners. Independent commissioners are expected to be able to defend the interests of external shareholders because of their independence. Independent commissioners seek to act as effective supervisors of managers

because they have an incentive to maintain their reputation as independent and effective decision makers (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Hou and Cheng (2012) conducted a study that highlighted the quality of supervision and advice from outside directors. They argue that the experience of outside directors and their compensation affects the firm performance through the quality of their supervision and advice. The more experience an outside director has will lead to better performance. This concept is also supported by the results of research conducted by Handayani (2017).

H2: The proportion of independent commissioners positively affects the firm performance

Qualifications of the Board of Commissioners and Firm Performance

One of the board qualifications that play an important role in performance is financial expertise. As also stipulated in the OJK (2016b) regulations for banking companies, members of the board of commissioners must have experience in banking and finance which includes experience in marketing, operations, funding, accounting, auditing, and other experiences. Several literatures investigate the effect of board financial expertise on firm performance. Darmadi (2013) found that the financial expertise of the board of commissioners does not have a significant impact on company performance. However, Ali, Rehman, Sarwar, Shoukat, and Farooq (2021) found that the board's financial expertise is important to improve company performance so that it becomes a good signal for foreign institutional investors' investment decisions. A board with financial expertise will be able to monitor the company's funding and investment decisions more effectively which leads to high firm performance (Ali et al., 2021). A degree in finance owned by the board of commissioners can provide managers and CEOs with directives and knowledge that will be applied in the company's financial management, as well as in issuing financial reports (Jeanjean & Stolowy, 2009).

H3: The qualifications of the board of commissioners positively affect the firm performance

Moderating Role of Corporate Secretary on the Board of Commissioners

Wulfsohn (2014) defines corporate secretary as a polymath, “people who know a lot about a lot”, that is someone who has many expertise in various fields of study. Complex knowledge is used to solve problems that arise in the company (Wulfsohn, 2014). This knowledge is not only limited to the company's constitution and administrative requirements, but also includes non-administrative matters, such as knowledge of the industry in which the company operates (Wulfsohn, 2014). Based on OJK (2014b) regulations, the corporate secretary must have the ability and knowledge in the fields of law, finance and capital markets. Armed with this ability, the company secretary can help provide input or advice to the board of commissioners in planning important company strategies to ensure that the strategy to be implemented will not violate applicable regulations. This means that the more professional expertise and experience the secretary has, the more the performance of the board of commissioners will improve the firm performance.

The corporate secretary has a role to provide advice to the board of commissioners regarding regulations in the capital market sector, assist the board of commissioners in the implementation of corporate governance, and ensure orientation programs for new board members (OJK, 2014b). Corporate secretary also has a role as a liaison and communication between the board and management (Wulfsohn, 2014). The corporate secretary manages and distributes very relevant information within the company so that increase efficiency in the decision-making process and proper supervision (Oneto & Díaz, 2021). This role is useful to support the performance of the independent board of commissioners, because as independent parties (outsiders) they have difficulty in obtaining information about the

condition of the company. People inside the company have better information and understanding than outsiders so that insiders are superior in decision making than outsiders (Nicholson & Kiel, 2007). Outside directors usually have other activities, so they do not have the time and effort to get information like the executives who manage the company (Armstrong, Guay, & Weber, 2010). The corporate secretary contributes to facilitating the flow of information from management to the board. Thus, the corporate secretary will be able to support independent commissioners to improve firm performance.

H4a: Corporate secretary positively moderates the influence of board size on firm performance.

H4b: Corporate secretary positively moderates the influence of the proportion of independent commissioners on firm performance.

H4c: Corporate secretary positively moderates the influence of the qualifications of the board of commissioners on firm performance.

Number of Audit Committee Meetings and Firm Performance

Meetings are held regularly by the audit committee together with external and internal auditors in order to assess the financial statements and performance of the executives. Committee meetings will produce a monitoring mechanism that can motivate executives to carry out their duties better (Farooque et al., 2019). As a result, a higher number of audit committee meetings can affect the firm performance. Some research found a positive relationship between the number of audit committee meetings and firm performance (Farooque et al., 2019; Okaily & Naueihed, 2020; Musallam, 2020). According to OJK rules regarding audit committees, it is stated that meetings must be held regularly at least once in three months and attendedar by more than half of the total members (OJK, 2015). Farooque et al. (2019) stated that in the meeting there will be sharing of experiences and skills among committee members and cooperation between the audit committee and auditors. This causes the audit committee in the company to meet frequently and look for ways to improve the firm performance. More audit committee meetings result in better monitoring which leads to better firm performance.

H5: The number of audit committee meetings positively affects the firm performance.

Audit Committee Qualifications and Firm Performance

The audit committee has a role in assisting the board of commissioners in carrying out its supervisory function. In carrying out this role, qualifications in the finance and accounting professions are one of the important characteristics that ensure the performance of the audit committee. The audit committee's financial expertise can contribute to better monitoring and lead to increased conservatism (Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2008). Knowledge of finance and accounting provides a good basis for audit committees to examine financial information. Musallam (2020) and Alodat et al. (2021) explains that the financial expertise of the audit committee is significantly related to the firm performance. More audit committee members with relevant financial experience can lead to better firm performance.

H6: The qualification of the audit committee positively affects the firm performance.

Number of Meetings of the Risk Monitoring Committee and Firm Performance

A risk monitoring committee is needed because companies face uncertainties that pose risks. In carrying out its duties, the risk monitoring committee can hold meetings according to its needs. At the meeting held, the risk monitoring committee discussed the company's strategic issues so that potential disruptions to the company's operations could be minimized (Hanggraeni, 2015, as cited in Wahyuni & Yuniati, 2020). Previous research

by Wahyuni & Yuniati (2020) found that the number of risk monitoring committee meetings had a positive relationship to firm performance. In the meeting held, there will be discussion and evaluation of the implementation of risk management and the risk monitoring committee can provide more direction to the company's risk management department so that risk mitigation can be further improved. Thus, it can reduce business risk and improve firm performance

H7: Risk monitoring committee meeting positively affects financial performance.

Risk Monitoring Committee Qualifications and Firm Performance

Members of the risk monitoring committee must have adequate qualifications to be able to understand and manage the challenges faced by the company. Al-Hadi, Hasan, and Habib (2016) explained that qualified risk committee can contribute and add value to the company by reducing business uncertainty and taking prudent actions in managing company problems. In the OJK rules regarding the risk monitoring committee, it is stated that the committee must consist of at least one person with expertise in the finance (OJK, 2014c; OJK, 2016a; OJK, 2020). For companies in the financial sector, financial expertise is an important factor to carry out the function of the risk monitoring committee effectively. The financial expertise includes aspects of accounting and strategic management so that the risk committee is better able to identify risks and determine appropriate risk management strategies (Aldhamari et al., 2020). More committee members who have financial expertise will be able to carry out their supervisory function on the implementation of risk management, it will reduce risk and improve firm performance.

H8: The qualification of the risk monitoring committee positively affects the firm performance.

Corporate Governance and Long-Term Firm Performance

Corporate governance is broadly and holistically defined as a system that can ensure that the company carries out its accountability to all stakeholders and carries out social responsibility actions in its business activities (Solomon, 2021: 6). This definition of corporate governance rests on the perception that a company that provides accountability to all stakeholders and optimizes its corporate governance system properly can maximize value creation in the long term (Solomon, 2021: 6). The positive effect of corporate governance on long-term firm performance is evidenced in the research of Ames, et al. (2018). In the results of his research, it was found that the risk committee as a governance mechanism was able to have a positive impact on the company's financial strength rating in the year after the formation of the risk committee. This provides evidence that governance has an impact on firm performance in the long term. The implementation of good corporate governance is expected to provide benefits to create added value, improve performance and maintain the company's sustainability in the long term. The ninth hypothesis is divided into a to j for each corporate governance proxy.

H9a: Corporate governance as proxied by the size of the board of commissioners influences the firm performance in the long term.

H9b: Corporate secretary positively moderates the size of the board of commissioners on the firm performance in the long term.

H9c: Corporate governance as proxied by the proportion of independent commissioners has a positive effect on the firm performance in the long term.

H9d: Corporate secretary positively moderates the proportion of independent commissioners on the firm performance in the long term.

H9e: Corporate governance as proxied by the qualifications of the board of commissioners has a positive effect on the firm performance in the long term.

H9f: Corporate secretary positively moderates the qualifications of the board of commissioners on the company's long-term performance.

H9g: Corporate governance as proxied by the number of audit committee meetings has a positive effect on the firm performance in the long term.

H9h: Corporate governance as proxied by audit committee qualifications has a positive effect on firm performance in the long term.

H9i: Corporate governance as proxied by the number of risk monitoring committee meetings has a positive effect on the firm performance in the long term.

H9j: Corporate governance as proxied by the qualification of the risk monitoring committee has a positive effect on the firm performance in the long term.

3. METHOD, DATA, AND ANALYSIS

Research Data and Sample

The population of this study are financial companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in 2017-2020. The data used in this study is cross-sectional data. The samples taken are companies that publish annual reports in Rupiah and contain adequate information about the variables raised in the study. Companies that do not have a risk monitoring committee are not included in the study. Besides that, outlier data was not included so that the research data met the assumption of normality. Description of sample is provided in Table 2. The sample test in this study is divided into four parts to see the effect of corporate governance on long-term firm performance (Table 1).

Table 1. Sample Split

Independent Variable Year (t)	Dependent Variable Year			
	Sample I (t)	**Sample II (t+1)**	**Sample III (t+2)**	**Sample IV (t+3)**
2017	2017	2018	2019	2020
2018	2018	2019	2020	
2019	2019	2020		
2020	2020			

Tabel 2. Sample Description

Description	2017	2018	2019	2020	Total
Companies listed on the IDX	91	96	99	103	389
Less:					
Companies that issue financial statements in foreign currencies	-1	-2	-1	-1	-5
Companies whose annual reports are not accessible	-1	-1		-2	-4
Companies that do not have a risk monitoring committee	-28	-30	-33	-32	-123
Companies whose information in their annual reports are incomplete	-1	-1	-1	-1	-4
Companies experiencing suspension of securities trading	-1	-1	-1		-3
Total companies that meet the criteria	**59**	**61**	**63**	**67**	**250**

The first sample is a test conducted to see the effect of corporate governance in year t on firm performance in the same year (t). The second sample is tested to see the effect of corporate governance in year t on firm performance in year t+1. The third sample is to examine the effect of corporate governance in year t on firm performance in year t+2. The fourth sample is to examine the effect of corporate governance in year t on firm performance in year t+3. The breakdown of the sample can be seen in table 1.

Total outlier data that is eliminated in sample I, II, III, and IV are 39, 18, 6 and 5 firm year, respectively. The total data obtained for sample I, II, III, and IV are 211, 165, 114, and 54 respectively. The definition of each variable is described in table 3.

Table 3. Variable Identification and Measurement

Label	Variables	Measurement
Dependent variable		
KP	Firm performance	Tobin's Q, that is total market value of all outstanding shares and firm's debt divided by total assets
Independent variables		
UDK	Board of commissioner size	Number of board of commissioners
PKI	Proportion of independent commissioner	The number of independent commissioners divided by the number of the board of commissioners
KUAL_DK	Board of commissioner qualification	Members of the board of commissioners who have financial expertise divided by the total members of the board of commissioners
RKA	Audit committee meeting	Number of audit committee meetings in one year
KUAL_KA	Audit committee qualification	Members of audit committee who have financial expertise divided by the total members of the audit committee
RKPR	Risk monitoring committee meeting	Number of risk monitoring committee meetings in one year
KUAL_KPR	Risk monitoring committee qualification	Members of risk monitoring committee who have financial expertise divided by the total members of the risk monitoring committee
Moderating variable		
CORSEC	Corporate secretary qualification	Total score of corporate secretary expertise by giving one score in each area of ability possessed, that is law, finance, accounting, knowledge of the company's industry. Maximum score is 4.
Control variables		
SIZE	Firm size	Natural logarithm of total assets
AGE	Firm age	Number of years since company was founded
LEV	Leverage	Total debt divided by total assets
LIQ	Liquidity	Total current assets divided by total current liabilities
YEAR	Research year	The research year is indicated by the number 1 for 2017, the number 2 for 2018, the number 3 for 2019, and the number 4 for 2020.

Research Model

The study used multiple linear regression as a data analysis technique. This analysis can measure the strength of the influence between two or more variables and show the direction of their influence (Ghozali, 2016: 94). The regression equation in this test contains an element of interaction, namely the multiplication between the independent and moderating variables. The regression equation used to test the hypothesis is as follows:

$$KP_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 UDK_{i,t} + \beta_2 UDK_t.CORSEC_{i,t} + \beta_3 PKI_{i,t} + \beta_4 PKI_{i,t}.CORSEC_{i,t} + \beta_5 KUAL_DK_{i,t} + \beta_6 KUAL_DK_{i,t}.CORSEC_{i,t} + \beta_7 CORSEC_{i,t} + \beta_8 RKA_{i,t} + \beta_9 KUAL_KA_{i,t} + \beta_{10} RKPR_{i,t} + \beta_{11} KUAL_KPR_{i,t} + \beta_{12} SIZE_{i,t} + \beta_{13} AGE_{i,t} + \beta_{14} LEV_{i,t} + \beta_{15} LIQ_{i,t} + \beta_{16} YEAR_{i,t} + e \quad (1)$$

$$KP_{i,t+1} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 UDK_{i,t} + \beta_2 UDK_t.CORSEC_{i,t} + \beta_3 PKI_{i,t} + \beta_4 PKI_{i,t}.CORSEC_{i,t} + \beta_5 KUAL_DK_{i,t} + \beta_6 KUAL_DK_{i,t}.CORSEC_{i,t} + \beta_7 CORSEC_{i,t} + \beta_8 RKA_{i,t} + \beta_9 KUAL_KA_{i,t} + \beta_{10} RKPR_{i,t} + \beta_{11} KUAL_KPR_{i,t} + \beta_{12} SIZE_{i,t+1} + \beta_{13} AGE_{i,t+1} + \beta_{14} LEV_{i,t+1} + \beta_{15} LIQ_{i,t+1} + \beta_{16} YEAR_{i,t+1} + e \quad (2)$$

$$KP_{i,t+2} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 UDK_{i,t} + \beta_2 UDK_t.CORSEC_{i,t} + \beta_3 PKI_{i,t} + \beta_4 PKI_{i,t}.CORSEC_{i,t} + \beta_5 KUAL_DK_{i,t} + \beta_6 KUAL_DK_{i,t}.CORSEC_{i,t} + \beta_7 CORSEC_{i,t} + \beta_8 RKA_{i,t} + \beta_9 KUAL_KA_{i,t} + \beta_{10} RKPR_{i,t} + \beta_{11} KUAL_KPR_{i,t} + \beta_{12} SIZE_{i,t+2} + \beta_{13} AGE_{i,t+2} + \beta_{14} LEV_{i,t+2} + \beta_{15} LIQ_{i,t+2} + \beta_{16} YEAR_{i,t+2} + e \quad (3)$$

$$KP_{i,t+3} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 UDK_{i,t} + \beta_2 UDK_t.CORSEC_{i,t} + \beta_3 PKI_{i,t} + \beta_4 PKI_{i,t}.CORSEC_{i,t} + \beta_5 KUAL_DK_{i,t} + \beta_6 KUAL_DK_{i,t}.CORSEC_{i,t} + \beta_7 CORSEC_{i,t} + \beta_8 RKA_{i,t} + \beta_9 KUAL_KA_{i,t} + \beta_{10} RKPR_{i,t} + \beta_{11} KUAL_KPR_{i,t} + \beta_{12} SIZE_{i,t+3} + \beta_{13} AGE_{i,t+3} + \beta_{14} LEV_{i,t+3} + \beta_{15} LIQ_{i,t+3} + e \quad (4)$$

4. RESULTS

Descriptive Statistics

The results of descriptive statistical tests for samples I, II, III, and IV are not presented in this paper to make concise. Some interesting findings in the descriptive statistics as follows. The firm performance variable (KP) measured by Tobin's Q in samples I and II has a similar average value, that is equal to 0.982 and 0.981. This value is close to 1, meaning that the market valuation of the company is close to the value of the company's listed assets. In sample III the average value of KP is 1.000, which means the market valuation of the company is the same as the value of its listed assets. Meanwhile, sample IV has an average KP value of 1.038. This shows that the average market valuation of the company exceeds the value of the company's assets.

UDK in samples I, II, III, and IV has a minimum score of 2 people. This minimum value is in accordance with OJK (2014a) regulations which require at least 2 members of the board of commissioners. The average value of UDK samples I, II, III, and IV shows that most financial sector companies have more than 4 commissioners. PKI in samples I, II, III, and IV had an average value of more than 0.5. This shows that the proportion of independent commissioners is more than 50 percent of the total members of the board of commissioners. This result is in accordance with OJK (2014a) regulations which require the proportion of independent commissioners to be at least 30 percent of the total members of the board of commissioners. KUAL_DK in samples I, II, III, and IV have an average value indicating that more than 80 percent of the board of commissioners in the company have financial expertise. CORSEC in samples I, II, III, and IV has the highest frequency score of

2. CORSEC has a minimum score of 0. This indicates that there is a corporate secretary who does not have a background of expertise in the fields of law, finance, accounting, or knowledge of the financial industry.

RKA has a minimum value of 3 in samples I, II, and III, while in sample IV it has a minimum value of 4. This shows that there are still companies whose number of meetings is below the minimum number of meetings regulated by OJK (2015) regarding the Audit Committee, which is 1 time in three months or 4 times a year. KUAL_KA in samples I to IV have an average value of more than 80 percent. This shows that most of the members of the audit committee have expertise in finance. RKPR in samples I, II, III, and IV have an average value which indicates that most companies hold meetings more than 7 times a year. There is no regulation that requires the minimum number of meetings that must be held in a year. KUAL_KPR in samples I to IV have an average of above 80 percent, this indicates that most of the risk monitoring committee members have expertise in finance.

This study also checks the bivariate correlation between the variables, using Pearson and Spearman correlation tests for samples I, II, III, and IV. The results of the Pearson correlation test on samples I, II, and III show that KP has a significant correlation with KUAL_DK and CORSEC. The relationship between KP and KUAL_DK shows a negative direction, meaning that the firm performance will decrease along with the increase in the number of commissioners with financial expertise. KP and CORSEC show a negative direction, meaning that the more expertise the corporate secretary has, the lower the firm performance will be.

KP is also significantly correlated with control variables, namely LEV and LIQ in samples I and II. LEV has a positive correlation with KP, which means the higher the leverage, the higher the KP. Leverage can be a mechanism to reduce agency conflict, because creditors will indirectly participate in overseeing the firm performance (Sulong et al., 2013). The relationship between KP and LIQ shows a negative direction, meaning that the higher the liquidity, the lower the KP. This can happen because companies invest their liquid resources in investments that do not provide positive returns (Li et al., 2020). In sample II, SIZE has a positive correlation with KP, which means that the larger the size of the company, the higher the firm performance. Larger companies have a greater ability to diversify investments, lower default risk, have more access to capital markets, lower financing costs, and thus have higher profits (Zeitun & Saleh, 2015). In sample IV, no significant correlation was found in the KP variable.

In samples I, II and III, it was found that there was a correlation between SIZE and UDK, RKA, and RKPR. This shows that large companies tend to have a greater number of commissioners. Audit committee meetings and risk monitoring committee meetings are also being held more in order to overcome the complex nature of business operations in the company. The correlation between independent variables with each other was also found in the Pearson and Spearman correlation test samples I to IV. However, this correlation does not exceed 0.8 so it does not indicate the existence of multicollinearity (Gujarati, 2003).

Regression Test

Based on the results of the t-test in sample I (table 4), the variables KUAL_DK, UDK_CORSEC, PKI_CORSEC, and KUAL_KA show a significance value of < 0.10 which means a significant effect on firm performance. The control variable LEV also has a significant positive effect. While other variables do not have a significant effect on firm performance. PKI_CORSEC and KUAL_KA have positive regression coefficients of 0.159 and 0.102, respectively. Meanwhile, KUAL_DK and UDK_CORSEC have negative coefficients of -0.212 and -0.013. Therefore, hypotheses H4b and H6 are accepted.

Table 4. Regression Test Result Sample I

Variable	B	Sig.
Constant	1.032	0.000***
UDK	0.021	0.107
PKI	-0.275	0.155
KUAL_DK	-0.212	0.085*
CORSEC	-0.051	0.562
UDK_CORSEC	-0.013	0.093*
PKI_CORSEC	0.159	0.077*
KUALDK_CORSEC	-0.007	0.914
RKA	-0.001	0.716
KUAL_KA	0.102	0.047**
RKPR	-0.001	0.827
KUAL_KPR	0.067	0.291
SIZE	-0.010	0.172
AGE	0.000	0.475
LEV	0.468	0.000***
LIQ	0.046	0.069*
YEAR	-0.005	0.534
Adjusted R^2 = 0.178		
F test = 3.848		Sig. = 0.000***

Table 5. Regression Test Result Sample II

Variable	B	Sig.
Constant	1.618	0.000***
UDK	-0.013	0.440
PKI	-0.887	0.000***
KUAL_DK	-0.449	0.011**
CORSEC	-0.284	0.024**
UDK_CORSEC	-0.004	0.699
PKI_CORSEC	0.380	0.001***
KUALDK_CORSEC	0.052	0.539
RKA	-0.002	0.453
KUAL_KA	0.088	0.210
RKPR	0.005	0.093*
KUAL_KPR	0.121	0.118
SIZE	-0.009	0.352
AGE	0.001	0.186
LEV	0.475	0.008***
LIQ	0.031	0.366
YEAR	-0.003	0.847
Adjusted R^2 = 0.260		
F test = 4.600		Sig. = 0.000***

Based on the results of the t-test in sample II (table 5) it shows that PKI, KUAL_DK, CORSEC, PKI_CORSEC, and RKPR have a significant effect on firm performance. PKI_CORSEC has a regression coefficient of 0.380 and is significant, so it can be concluded that CORSEC moderates the effect of PKI on firm performance positively. These results support hypothesis H9d. RKPR has a positive regression coefficient of 0.05 so that the hypothesis H9i is accepted. PKI, KUAL_DK, CORSEC have negative regression coefficients of -0.887, -0.449, -0.284, respectively. While the other independent variables showed insignificant results.

Table 6. Regression Test Result Sample III

Variable	B	Sig.
Constant	1.854	0.001***
UDK	-0.063	0.037**
PKI	-0.025	0.944
KUAL_DK	-0.829	0.016**
CORSEC	-0.289	0.194
UDK_CORSEC	0.024	0.166
PKI_CORSEC	0.039	0.830
KUALDK_CORSEC	0.058	0.718
RKA	-0.013	0.026**
KUAL_KA	0.343	0.009***
RKPR	0.016	0.008***
KUAL_KPR	0.053	0.698
SIZE	-0.024	0.167
AGE	0.001	0.570
LEV	0.665	0.039**
LIQ	0.094	0.119
YEAR	0.056	0.195
Adjusted R^2 = 0.210		
F test = 2.872		Sig. = 0.001***

Table 7. Regression Test Result Sample IV

Variable	B	Sig.
Constant	2.629	0.017**
UDK	-0.063	0.287
PKI	0.473	0.451
KUAL_DK	-1.095	0.080*
CORSEC	-0.646	0.098
UDK_CORSEC	0.050	0.148
PKI_CORSEC	0.136	0.662
KUALDK_CORSEC	0.220	0.454
RKA	-0.028	0.032**
KUAL_KA	0.680	0.020**
RKPR	0.009	0.475
KUAL_KPR	0.143	0.578
SIZE	-0.036	0.308
AGE	-0.001	0.826
LEV	0.382	0.554
LIQ	-0.034	0.800
Adjusted R^2 = 0.088		
F test = 1.341		Sig. = 0.227

In the results of the t-test sample III (table 6), the variables UDK, KUAL_DK, RKA, KUAL_KA, RKPR, and LEV have a significant effect on firm performance. UDK, KUAL_DK, and RKA have regression coefficients of -0.063, -0.829, and -0.013, respectively. Thus, H9a is accepted. KUAL_KA and RKPR have positive regression coefficients of 0.343 and 0.016 so that H9h and H9i are accepted. Sample IV cannot be further discussed on the

results of the t test because based on the results of the F test (table 7) it shows insignificant results so that the regression model used is not feasible to use.

5. DISCUSSION

The Effect of Corporate Governance on Current Year Firm Performance

The results of this study indicate that the size of the board of commissioners has no effect on firm performance. Regardless of the number of members of the board of commissioners in the company, they are required to play an active role in their supervisory function. Each member of the board of commissioners has an obligation to become a board of integrity, professional and has the ability so that it can carry out its functions properly (KNKG, 2006). Furthermore, the qualified corporate secretary negatively moderates the influence of size of the board of commissioners on firm performance. This means that the presence of the corporate secretary weakens the relationship between the size of the board of commissioners and the firm performance.

The proportion of independent commissioners has no effect on the firm performance. This finding is in line with Ongore, K'Obonyo, Ogutu, & Bosire (2015) and Nicholson & Kiel (2007). Company insiders have better information and understanding than outsiders so that insiders are superior in decision making than outsiders (Nicholson & Kiel, 2007). Independent commissioners are independent parties who come from outside the company and they may have difficulty obtaining information flow from management about the company. Therefore, independent commissioners cannot perform their duties optimally so that it does not significantly affect the firm performance. However, the presence of qualified corporate secretary can assist the independent board of commissioners in improving the firm performance. The results showed that the corporate secretary can moderate the relationship between the proportion of independent commissioners on firm performance. The corporate secretary plays a role in providing advice to the board of commissioners regarding compliance with laws and regulations in the capital market sector (OJK, 2014b). The corporate secretary also acts as a communication liaison between the board and management to ensure the adequacy of information obtained by the board (Wulfsohn, 2014). With advice on regulations and the adequacy of this flow of information, it can support the performance of the independent board of commissioners which leads to increased company performance.

The qualifications of the board of commissioners have a significant negative effect on firm performance. This finding is contradicting to the previous research, Ali, et al. (2021), who found that the financial expertise of the board of commissioners can monitor the company's funding and investment decisions more effectively to improve firm performance. Furthermore, the corporate secretary does not moderate the relationship between the qualifications of the board of commissioners and the firm performance. It may suggest that the more boards that are financially qualified, this is considered sufficient to carry out their functions so that the role of the corporate secretary in moderating the board of commissioners and firm performance becomes insignificant.

The audit committee meeting has no significant effect on the firm performance. The audit committee meeting was held to discuss the financial statement and performance appraisal of the executives (Farooque et al. 2019). However, even though a meeting is held, it may be that the decisions and evaluation results in the meeting cannot directly affect the firm performance. The evaluation results from the meeting do not directly impact the firm performance but the evaluation of internal control affects the performance of the executives, which then the performance of the executives will affect the firm performance.

In addition, if the meeting is held only as a formality to meet the minimum requirements for the meeting, the audit committee meeting will not have an impact on the firm performance.

Audit committee qualifications have a significant positive effect on firm performance. The more members of the audit committee who have financial expertise, the firm performance will increase. These results are in line with Musallam's (2020) research conducted on companies in Palestine and Alodat et al. (2021) on Malaysian companies. The audit committee has a role in carrying out the supervisory function of internal control and financial reporting. Supervision of this internal control can reduce the possibility of fraud in the company. In addition, the financial expertise of the audit committee can serve to carry out better monitoring of the financial reporting process, thereby reducing the possibility of misstatement of financial information (Dezoort & Salterio, 2001 as cited in Alodat et al., 2021). Related to the agency theory. this can reduce the information asymmetry that occurs and provide protection for investors. Thus, investors can give a high assessment of the company so that the firm performance (Tobin's Q) is increasing.

The risk monitoring committee has no effect on the firm performance. Meetings are held to discuss the risks faced and evaluate the implementation of risk management. The results of the risk management evaluation in this year's meeting may not affect the firm performance in the same year. This is because risk is an event that does not necessarily occur currently. Therefore, the result of the evaluation of risk management policies may only be realized in the future.

The qualification of the risk monitoring committee in finance does not affect the firm performance. The qualifications of the risk monitoring committee may not be the main consideration for investors in assessing the company. This is because there are many other factors beyond the qualifications of the risk monitoring committee that can be considered by investors in assessing the company.

The Effect of Corporate Governance on Long-Term Firm Performance

The effect of corporate governance in year (t) on firm performance in year t+1 is found in the variables PKI, PKI_CORSEC, KUAL_DK, CORSEC, RKPR, and LEV, while on firm performance in year t+2 it is found in the variables UDK, KUAL_DK, RKA, KUAL_KA, RKPR, and LEV. In testing the influence of governance on firm performance in the same year (t) shows no influence of PKI, but in year t+1, PKI has a negative effect on firm performance. This can be caused by the lack of information held by the independent commissioners so that they are less effective in carrying out their functions. The impact of this is felt in year t+1, where the higher the proportion of independent commissioners, the lower the firm performance. This negative influence of the PKI can turn into a positive one with the presence of the corporate secretary. PKI_CORSEC has a significant positive effect, meaning that the corporate secretary can positively moderate the relationship between the proportion of independent commissioners on the firm performance in year t+1. This shows that a quality corporate secretary can support an independent board of commissioners to improve firm performance. The role of the corporate secretary in supporting the performance of the independent board of commissioners, among others, is as a communication liaison between the board and management, also as advisor to the board of commissioners.

UDK has a significant negative effect on the company's performance in year t+2. The more the number of members of the board of commissioners, the effectiveness of the board will decrease due to problems in communication and decision making (Jensen, 1993). The

right number of boards is a trade-off between the competencies represented and the costs arising from increased free-riding among boards (Bennedsen, Kongsted, & Nielsen, 2008).

KUAL_DK in the results of this study has a negative effect on the firm performance in years t+1 and t+2. This can be due to the more members who have financial expertise, there may be free riding among them. As a result, the board of commissioners becomes less active in carrying out their duties and has an impact on the firm performance decline.

RKA does not affect the firm performance in year t+1, but negatively affects the firm performance in year t+2. More meetings lower the firm performance in the future. This can be caused by the increasing number of meetings, decision making becomes too long and too late, so that the evaluation of executive performance becomes less effective which ultimately has an impact on the decline in firm performance.

KUAL_KA positively affects the firm performance t+2. The audit committee's financial expertise can be a good basis for testing financial information. The implementation of the audit committee's supervisory function will be able to assist the board of commissioners in providing better direction to the board of directors to prevent fraud and misstatement of financial statements in the future. This will improve the firm performance in the future.

RKPR has a positive influence on the firm performance in years t+1 and t+2. In the meeting held, the risk monitoring committee can provide direction for the risk management committee to minimize risks that will occur in the future to result in increased firm performance in the future.

6. CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS

Conclusion

This research enriches the literature review on corporate governance, especially regarding the corporate secretary and the impact of governance on long-term firm performance which is still rarely studied in Indonesia. The study found the role of the corporate secretary in moderating the relationship between the proportion of independent commissioners on firm performance. In the firm performance in the same year, the results showed that KUAL_KA and PKI_CORSEC had a positive influence on firm performance, KUAL_DK and UDK_CORSEC had a negative effect, while other governance variables did not show a significant effect. The effect of governance on long-term firm performance is found in this study. PKI negatively affects the firm performance in year t+1. In addition, PKI_CORSEC has a significant positive effect, which means that CORSEC is a moderator that strengthens the relationship between PKI and firm performance. The individual CORSEC variable also shows a significant negative effect on the firm performance so that CORSEC is a quasi-moderator variable that can be used as an independent or moderator variable. KUAL_DK negatively affects the firm performance in years t+1 and t+2. In the firm performance in year t+2, UDK and RKA have a negative influence, while KUAL_KA and RKPR have a positive influence.

This research has several practical implications for companies. Corporate governance implemented in the current year has an influence on the firm performance in the future. Therefore, the company should pay attention to the implementation of good governance today so that the firm performance in the future will increase. First, the company may consider recruiting a corporate secretary who has various expertise, especially in the fields of law, finance, accounting and corporate industry. The presence of a qualified corporate secretary can support independent commissioners to improve firm performance both at present and in the long term. Second, the number of members of the board of

commissioners should be adjusted to the most appropriate needs of the company because more members of the board of commissioners can reduce the firm performance due to difficulties in communication, coordination, and free-riding among members. Third, companies can consider the financial expertise of audit committee members. The more members of the audit committee who have financial expertise, the better the supervisory function on executive performance will lead to an increase in firm performance. Fourth, the number of meetings of the risk monitoring committee can be considered in governance to improve the firm performance in the future. The more meetings are held, the risk monitoring committee can provide direction for the risk management committee to minimize risks to the company in the future so that the firm performance can improve.

Limitation and suggestions

Research on long-term company performance is only up to year t+3 and is only conducted on financial sector companies. Hence, future research can use a sample of companies other than the financial sector to see the effect of corporate governance in different sectors. The research year can be extended to see longer-term impact over the next three years. Moreover, further research can use other data collection methods such as interviews or looking for biographies from other than annual report source in order to obtain more complete information, because in this research data is only taken based on biographical information disclosed in the annual report to identify the qualifications of the board of commissioners, corporate secretary, audit committee and risk monitoring committee.

REFERENCES

Aldhamari, R., Nor, M.N.M., Boudiab, M., & Mas'ud, A. (2020). The impact of political connection and risk committee on corporate financial performance: Evidence from financial firms in Malaysia. *Corporate Governance, 20*(7), 1281-1305. https://doi.org/10.1108/cg-04-2020-0122

Al-Hadi, A., Hasan, M.M., & Habib, A. (2016). Risk committee, firm life cycle, and market risk disclosures. *Corporate Governance: An International Review, 24*(2), 145–170. https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12115

Ali, S., Rehman, R.U., Sarwar, B., Shoukat, A., & Farooq, M. (2021). Board financial expertise and foreign institutional investment: the moderating role of ownership concentration. *Review of International Business and Strategy, 32*(3), 325-345. https://doi.org/10.1108/ribs-02-2021-0032

Alodat, Y.A., Salleh, Z., Hashim, H.A., & Sulong, F. (2021). Corporate governance and firm performance: empirical evidence from Jordan. *Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting.* https://doi.org/10.1108/jfra-12-2020-0361

Ames, D.A., Hines, C.S., & Sankara, J. (2018). Board risk committees: Insurer financial strength ratings and performance. *Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 37*(2), 130-145. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2018.02.003

Armstrong, C.S., Guay, W.R., & Weber, J.P. (2010). The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting. *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, *50*, 179-234. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.10.001

Bennedsen, M., Kongsted, H.C., & Nielsen, K.M. (2008). The causal effect of board size in the performance of small and medium-sized firms. *Journal of Banking and Finance*, *32*(1), 1098-1109. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2007.09.016

Darmadi, S. (2013). Board members' education and firm performance: evidence from a developing economy. *International Journal of Commerce and Management, 23*(2), 113-135. https://doi.org/10.1108/10569211311324911

Darwis, H. (2009). Corporate governance terhadap kinerja perusahaan. *Jurnal Keuangan dan Perbankan, 13*(3), 418-430. Retrieved from https://jurnal.unmer.ac.id/index.php/jkdp/article/view/1090

Davinda, R., Mukhzarudfa, & Zulma, G.W.M. (2021). Pengaruh ukuran perusahaan, ukuran dewan komisaris, dan pengungkapan modal manusia terhadap kinerja perusahaan di Indonesia. *Ekonomis: Journal of Economics and Business, 5*(2), 526-534. https://doi.org/10.33087/ekonomis.v5i2.409

Farooque, O.A., Buachoom, W., & Sun, L. (2019). Board, audit committee, ownership and financial performance – emerging trends from Thailand. *Pacific Accounting Review, 32*(1), 54-81. https://doi.org/10.1108/par-10-2018-0079

Fadillah, A.R. (2017). Analisis pengaruh dewan komisaris independen, kepemilikan manajerial dan kepemilikan institusional terhadap kinerja perusahaan yang terdaftar di LQ45. *Jurnal Akuntansi, 12*(1), 37-52. Retrieved from https://jurnal.unsil.ac.id/index.php/jak/article/view/294/206

Fama, E.F., & Jensen, M.C. (1983). Separation of Ownership and Control. *Journal of Law and Economics, 26*, 301-325. https://doi.org/10.1086/467037

Fuad, A.R. (2014). Analisis pengaruh mekanisme corporate governance terhadap kebijakan pengungkapan informasi sosial dan lingkungan (studi empiris perusahaan perbankan yang terdaftar di bursa efek Indonesia tahun 2008-2012). *Diponegoro Journal of Accounting, 3*(2), 1-12. Retrieved from https://ejournal3.undip.ac.id/index.php/accounting/article/view/6090

Ghozali, I. (2016). *Aplikasi analisis multivariate dengan program IBM SPSS 23* (edisi ke-8). Semarang: Badan Penerbit Universitas Diponegoro.

Gujarati, D.N. (2003). *Basic Econometrics* (4th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill Companies.

Handayani, B.D. (2017). Meknisme corporate governance, enterprise risk management dan nilai perusahaan perbankan. *Jurnal Keuangan dan Perbankan, 21*(1), 70-81. Retrieved from https://jurnal.unmer.ac.id/index.php/jkdp/article/view/1228/813

Hou, S.R.S, & Cheng, C.W. (2012). Outside director experience, compensation, and performance. *Manajerial Finance, 38*(10), 914-938. https://doi.org/10.1108/03074351211255146

Irma, A.D.A. (2019). Pengaruh komisaris, komite audit, struktur kepemilikan, size dan leverage terhadap kinerja keuangan perusahaan properti, perumahan dan konstruksi 2013-2017. *Jurnal Ilmu Manajemen, 7*(3), 697-712. Retrieved from https://jurnalmahasiswa.unesa.ac.id/index.php/jim/article/view/28953/26507

Jeanjean, T. & Stolowy, H. (2009). Determinants of board members' financial expertise–empirical evidence from France. *The International Journal of Accounting, 44*, 378-402. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intacc.2009.09.002

Jensen, M.C. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit, and failure of internal control systems. *Journal of Finance, 48*(3), 831-880. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04022.x

Kakabadse, A., Khan, N. & Kakabadse, N.K. (2016). Company secretary: a role of breadth and majesty. *Society and Business Review, 11*(3), 333-349. https://doi.org/10.1108/SBR-04-2016-0023.

Komite Nasional Kebijakan Governance. (2006). *Pedoman Umum Good Corporate Governance Indonesia*. Jakarta: KNKG.

Krishnan, G.V. & Visvanathan, G. (2008). Does the SOX definition of an accounting expert matter? The association between audit committee directors' accounting expertise and accounting conservatism. *Contemporary Accounting Research, 25*(3), 827-857. https://doi.org/10.1506/car.25.3.7

Li, K., Musah, M., Kong, Y., Mensah, I.A., Antwi, S.K., Bawuah, J., Donkor, M., Coffie, C.P.K., Osei, A.A. (2020). Liquidity and firms' financial performance nexus: a panel evidence from non-financial firms listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange. *Sage Journal,* 1-20. https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244020950363

Mai, M.U. (2015). Corporate governance dan interdependensi antara leverage, profitabilitas serta kebijakan dividen dalam mencapai nilai perusahaan. *Jurnal Keuangan dan Perbankan, 19*(2), 213-225. Retrieved from https://jurnal.unmer.ac.id/index.php/jkdp/article/view/844/496

Musallam, S.R.M. (2020). Effects of board characteristics, audit committee and risk management on corporate performance: evidence from Palestinian listed companies. *International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management, 13*(4), 691-706. https://doi.org/10.1108/imefm-12-2017-0347

Nicholson, G. J., & Kiel, G. C. (2007). Can Directors Impact Performance? A case-based test of three theories of corporate governance. *Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15*(4), 585–608. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2007.00590.x

Okaily, A.J., & Naueihed S. (2020). Audit committee effectiveness and family firms: impact on performance. *Management Decision, 58*(6), 1021-1034. https://doi.org/10.1108/md-04-2018-0422

Oneto, A., & Díaz, E. (2021). Profile of a Corporate Secretary in Latin America. Caracas: CAF. Retrieved from http://scioteca.caf.com/handle/123456789/1792

Ongore, V.O., K'Obonyo, P.O., Ogutu, M., & Bosire, E.M. (2015). Board composition and financial performance: Empirical analysis of companies listed at the Nairobi securities exchange. *International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, 5*(1), 23-43. Retrieved from https://www.econjournals.com/index.php/ijefi/article/view/806

Osangkul, V., Treepongkaruna, S., Jiraporn, P., Uyar, A. (2021). Do firms adjust corporate governance in response to economic policy uncertainty? Evidence from board size. *Finance Research Letters, 39*. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2020.101613

Otoritas Jasa Keuangan. (2014a). *Peraturan Otoritas Jasa Keuangan No.33/POJK.04/2014 tentang Direksi dan Dewan Komisaris Emiten atau Perusahaan Publik*.

Otoritas Jasa Keuangan. (2014b). *Peraturan Otoritas Jasa Keuangan No. 35/POJK.04/2014 tentang Sekretaris Perusahaan*.

Otoritas Jasa Keuangan. (2014c). *Surat Edaran Otoritas Keuangan Nomor 16/ SEOJK.05/2014 tentang Komite pada Dewan Komisaris, Perusahaan Asuransi, Perusahaan Asuransi Syariah, Perusahaan Reasuransi, dan Perusahaan Reasuransi Syariah.*

Otoritas Jasa Keuangan. (2015). *Peraturan Otoritas Jasa Keuangan Nomor 55/POJK.04/2015 tentang Pembentukan dan Pedoman Pelaksanaan Kerja Komite Audit.*

Otoritas Jasa Keuangan. (2016a). *Peraturan Otoritas Jasa Keuangan No. 55/POJK.03/2016 tentang Penerapan Tata Kelola Bagi Bank Umum.*

Otoritas Jasa Keuangan. (2016b). *Surat Edaran Otoritas Keuangan Nomor 39/SEOJK.03/2016 tentang Penilaian Kemampuan dan Kepatutan bagi Calon Pemegang Saham Pengendali, Calon Anggota Direksi, dan Calon Anggota Dewan Komisaris Bank.*

Otoritas Jasa Keuangan. (2020). *Peraturan Otoritas Jasa Keuangan No. 29/POJK.05/2020 tentang Perubahan atas Peraturan Otoritas Jasa Keuangan Nomor 30/POJK.05/2014 tentang Tata Kelola Perusahaan yang Baik Bagi Perusahaan Pembiayaan.*

Peij, S., Bezemer, P. and Maassen, G. (2015). Role ambiguity and conflicts: a study of company secretaries and two-tier boards in The Netherlands. *Corporate Ownership and Control*, *12(3)*, 114-123. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv12i3p10

Puni, A., & Anlesinya, A. (2020). Corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance in a developing country. *International Journal of Law and Management, 62*(2), 147-169. https://doi.org/10.1108/ijlma-03-2019-0076

Ramadan, M.M., & Hassan, M.K. (2021). Board gender diversity, governance and Egyptian listed firms' performance. *Journal of Accounting in Emerging Economies*. https://doi.org/10.1108/jaee-02-2021-0057

Sheikh, W., & Alom, K. (2021). Corporate governance, board practices and performance of shipping firms in Bangladesh. *The Asian Journal of Shipping and Logistics, 37*(1), 259-267. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ajsl.2021.06.0052092-5212

Solomon, J. (2021). *Corporate Governance and Accountability* (5th ed.). USA: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.

Sulong, Z., Hussin, A.H., McGowman, C.B. (2013). Managerial ownership, leverage, and audit quality impact on firm performance: evidence from the Malaysia ace market. *Accounting and Taxation, 5*(1), 59-70. Retrieved from http://www.theibfr2.com/RePEc/ibf/acttax/at-v5n1-2013/AT-V5N1-2013-7.pdf

Vavilina, A. V., Kirillova, O.Y., & Levanova, L.N. (2018). Evolving the corporate secretary in Russian economic practice. *Proceedings of The International Scientific Conference*. Czech Republic: Moravian University College Olomouc

Wahyuni, E.S, & Yuniati, T. (2020). Pengaruh risk monitoring committee dan business risk terhadap kinerja keuangan dan nilai perusahaan (studi pada bank konvensional yang terdaftar di BEI periode 2015-2018). *Jurnal Ilmu dan Riset Manajemen, 9*(4), 1-17. Retrieved from http://jurnalmahasiswa.stiesia.ac.id/index.php/jirm/article/view/3028

Wulfsohn, L. (2014). The Company Secretary as Polymath. International Finance Corporation: Corporate Governance Knowledge Publication. Retrieved from https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/topics_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/ifc+cg/resources/private+sector+opinion/the+company+secretary+as+polymath

Xing, L., Duan, T., & Hou, W. (2017). Do board secretaries influence management earnings forecasts?. *Journal of Business Ethics, 154*(2), 537-574. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-017-3478-6

Zeitun, R. & Saleh, A.S. (2015). Dynamic performance, financial leverage and financial crisis: evidence from GCC countries. *EuroMed Journal of Business, 10*(2), 147-162. https://doi.org/10.1108/EMJB-08-2014-0022