

Multi-Actor Collaboration from a Collaborative Governance Perspective: Shallot Agropolitan in Sumenep

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Abstract: Sumenep Regency has great potential for agropolitan development, particularly for shallots as a leading commodity. This development requires collaboration among government, the private sector, and the community through a collaborative governance approach. This study aims to analyze collaborative governance in shallot agropolitan development in Sumenep Regency, from the early stages of collaboration through to the outcomes achieved. The study employed a descriptive qualitative design, with informants selected through purposive sampling, totaling 15 people consisting of the Regional Government represented by Bappeda, DKPP, DKUPP, and the extension team; the PIR Cooperative (Permata Indah Rubaru); the community (representatives of farmer groups (GAPOKTAN), middlemen, retailers, and landowners); and academics (lecturers at Wiraraja University). Data were collected through in-depth interviews, observation, and documentation, and then analyzed using the interactive model of Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña, which comprises data condensation, data display, and conclusion drawing. The data were subsequently refined and deepened through a focus group discussion (FGD) involving the research team and all informants. The results show that collaborative governance has not yet fully succeeded in creating a prosperous and self-reliant community. The obstacles identified include stakeholders' limited time, limited information, limited human resources, and limited facilities and infrastructure, compounded by low public awareness of the importance of the program.

1. Introduction

Agropolitan is an integrated, agriculture-based development paradigm that encompasses on-farm and off-farm sectors and their supporting elements (Miranti & Yuliani, 2023), aiming to increing community income and welfare through rural–urban linkages and a competitive agribusiness system (Rahman et al., 2022). However, agropolitan development cannot be understood merely as a concept. The more decisive question is whether the integration it promises is actually realized in the field, particularly for shallots in Sumenep Regency.

Shallots are a leading commodity in Rubaru District, with the potential to raise farmers' incomes, food security, and the local economy (Noviandika et al., 2024). However, current conditions do not match this potential. In 2024, the harvested area of shallots in Rubaru District ranged from 1,000 to 1,600

ha, with production of 13–14 tons (BPS, 2025), yet productivity reached only 8 tons per ha. Farmers can plant shallots twice a year, namely in January–March (*on season*) and June–August (*off season*), which is below the potential of improved varieties of 13,000 tons/ha.

According to the Sumenep Regional Long-Term Development Plan (RPJPD) document, the Farmer Exchange Rate (NTP) of Sumenep Regency has generally moved positively above the welfare threshold, rising gradually from 101.39 to beyond 103.26 over the long-term trend (bappeda.sumenepkab.go.id, n.d.) Nevertheless, farmers' welfare has not improved commensurately, largely because of sudden and frequent spikes in the index of prices paid by farmers for non-subsidized fertilizers and pest-control chemicals. This erodes real purchasing power, slowing NTP growth among independent farmers. At the regional level, farmers face limited access to technology, unstable markets, and inadequate production and distribution infrastructure (Arief, 2023). These problems do not stand alone. They are tied to how various parties jointly manage the area's development.

Normatively, policy already provides a foundation. Government Regulation (PP) No. 15 of 2010 defines an agropolitan area as an area with functional linkages and spatial hierarchy between the settlement system and the agribusiness system (Zuhrufia, 2016). At the regional level, Regional Regulation (Perda) No. 12 of 2013 on the Spatial Plan (RTRW) of Sumenep Regency 2013–2033 (Article 6(b) and Article 7(2)) contains provisions on agropolitan areas Ariyani (2016) and designates Rubaru District as a strategic area for agricultural development (Sabarna & Ramdani, 2025). This mandate calls for an integrated agribusiness system spanning the upstream, farming, downstream, and supporting-services subsystems (Suenang et al., 2021), which cannot be achieved without cross-actor coordination.

Implementation, however, presents a different picture. Coordination among actors in developing the Rubaru agropolitan area has been apparent since the early stage of program implementation. In 2019, the area's development was assessed as still running separately among stakeholders and showing a tendency toward sectoral egos. This indicates that integration across regional government agencies (OPD) is one of the challenges in implementing the agropolitan program. In addition, the supporting facilities of the agropolitan area are not merely a matter of infrastructure availability, but also of how well these facilities are used and how well they connect to farmers' needs and the shallot value chain. The policy mandate demands an integrated area, whereas practice shows fragmented work. This gap shows that the main problem in shallot agropolitan development in Sumenep lies in governance, not merely in cultivation techniques.

To optimize shallot agropolitan development in Sumenep Regency, effective collaboration is needed among various stakeholders: the regional government, in this case the Regional Development Planning Agency (Bappeda) as coordinator; the Food Security and Agriculture Office, which plays the technical role; the Cooperatives, SMEs and Industry Office as a supporter of agropolitan development; farmers organized in 11 Associations of Farmer Groups (Gapoktan) in Rubaru District; and the private sector, in this case the Joint Business Group (KUB) in Rubaru District, namely PT Permata Indah Rubaru (PIR)(Mukti, 2025).

Given these conditions, collaborative governance needs to be studied for three reasons specific to this case. *First*, the gap between mandate and implementation occurs in relationships among institutionally established actors, so the analysis should focus on the quality of collaboration, not merely the presence of actors. *Second*, collaboration does not occur automatically simply because many parties are involved; each actor brings a different perspective on the same problem, making shared understanding difficult to build (Ansell, 2014). *Third*, the *collaborative governance* approach offers "shared ownership" of problems (Prabowo et al., 2021) and leads to decisions that are more inclusive, transparent, and sus-

tainable. Without this analysis, efforts to improve farmers' productivity and welfare risk repeating the same sectoral program patterns.

This study uses collaborative governance, that is, an arrangement in which government, together with other parties, whether organizations, individuals, or the private sector, achieves public goals (Donahue & Richard J. Zeckhauser, 2011), not as a collection of definitions but as a framework with dimensions that can be used to dissect the case. The model of Ansell and Gash (2008) provides four dimensions: (1) starting conditions (power imbalances, resources, and relationship history), (2) institutional design (inclusiveness and ground rules), (3) facilitative leadership, and (4) the collaborative process (face-to-face dialogue, trust, commitment, shared understanding, and intermediate outcomes). Ratner's (2012) framework complements it with three practical stages: identifying obstacles and opportunities, developing a shared strategy, and planning collaborative action. Ansell and Gash explain *why* collaboration succeeds or fails, whereas Ratner explains *how* to carry out its stages on local development issues (Ratner, 2012). The five problems in relationships among actors described above are read through these dimensions: coordination and authority through institutional design and leadership, conflicts of interest and resource imbalances through starting conditions, and participation through the collaborative process. Research on shallot agropolitan agricultural development has been widely discussed by previous researchers. The position of this study relative to earlier work can be seen in Table 1 below.

Table 1. Comparative Study on Agropolitan Areas

Researchers	Focus	Theory/approach	Findings	What has not been revealed
(Rozikin & Haris, 2021)	Agropolitan/agricultural development	Local economic development	Identified driving and inhibiting factors in the development of local economic resources in Sumenep Regency by applying force field analysis	Economic aspects only, without examining relations and collaboration among actors
(Kurli et al., 2024)	Agropolitan development	<i>Local Economic Resources Development</i> (LERD), marketing communication strategy	Marketing communication strategy used by the Rubaru Farmer Group to increase shallot sales through the development of facilities and infrastructure	Development strategy, without analyzing the collaboration process
(Arrozaaq, 2016) ; (Prabowo et al., 2021)	<i>Collaborative governance</i> in other sectors	[Ansell & Gash/ others]	The process of collaboration among stakeholders in developing the Minapolitan Area was fairly good, driven by shared principles, motivation, and capacity	Different context; not yet tested in shallot agropolitan areas
This study	<i>Collaborative governance</i> in a shallot agropolitan area	Ansell & Gash (2008) + Ratner (2012)	-	Quality of relations among actors from starting conditions to outcomes in Rubaru District

This comparison reveals three gaps. *First*, agropolitan studies generally focus on technical, economic, and policy aspects, without examining the principles of collaboration among stakeholders in depth. *Second*, *collaborative governance* studies have been applied widely across regions, but their dynamics in specific agricultural areas such as shallot agropolitan areas are still rarely examined. *Third*, no study has yet linked the quality of collaboration (coordination, authority, conflict, resources, participation) with outcomes at the farmer level, such as productivity and welfare.

The novelty of this study lies in the integration of the Ansell and Gash model with Ratner's framework to read collaboration in a shallot agropolitan area, from starting conditions and process through to its outcomes for farmers, taking into account the social and cultural characteristics of Sumenep Regency. This integration helps explain the gap between policy mandates and implementation through relations among actors. On this basis, the study aims to analyze: *First*, the starting conditions, institutional design, and leadership in the collaboration for shallot agropolitan development in Sumenep Regency. *Second*, the collaboration process among actors, including coordination, division of authority, handling of conflicts of interest, and participation; and third, the outcomes of the collaboration along with its inhibiting factors and opportunities.

2. Literature Review

Theoretical and Conceptual Foundation

Collaborative governance is a governance arrangement in which government works together with non-government organizations and individuals to achieve public goals (Holzer, 2012). According to Emerson and Gerlak, collaborative governance is defined as the processes and structures of public policy decision-making and management that involve people constructively across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of government, the public sphere, the private sector, and civil society, in order to achieve public purposes that could not otherwise be accomplished (Emerson et al., 2012). Ansell and Gash (2018) define it more operationally as an arrangement in which one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative collective decision-making process to make or implement public policy or to manage public programs or assets. From this definition, a collaboration can be categorized as collaborative governance if it meets six criteria (Ansell & Gash, 2018):

1. the forum is initiated by public agencies;
2. participants include non-state actors;
3. non-state actors are directly engaged in decision-making, not merely consulted;
4. the forum is formally organized and meets collectively;
5. decisions are sought through consensus; and
6. the focus is on public policy or public management.

These criteria serve as a key distinguishing mark. The involvement of many actors in one program is not necessarily collaborative governance if non-state actors are merely program recipients. Three theoretical reasons explain why this approach suits the case of shallot agropolitan development. First, agropolitan problems cross organizational boundaries and cannot be resolved by a single agency. Second, actors hold different perspectives on the same problem, so a process of building shared understanding is needed (Ansell, 2014). Third, collaboration creates shared ownership of problems (Prabowo et al., 2021), which supports program sustainability.

The Ansell and Gash Model (2008)

This model explains *why* collaboration succeeds or fails through four interacting variables, as shown in Table 2 below:

Dimension	Content	Analytical meaning
Starting conditions	Imbalances of power/resources/knowledge; incentives to participate; history of conflict or cooperation	Explains whether actors begin collaborating from an equal position and with mutual trust
Institutional design	Participatory inclusiveness; forum exclusivity; clear ground rules; process transparency	Explains whether key actors can enter and whether binding rules exist
Facilitative leadership	Ability to manage the process, keep negotiations going, and empower weaker actors	Explains who drives the process and bridges differences
Collaborative process	Face-to-face dialogue; trust building; commitment to the process; shared understanding; intermediate outcomes	A cycle that determines whether the collaboration strengthens or weakens

The collaborative process is cyclical: dialogue builds trust, trust strengthens commitment, commitment helps shared understanding to form, and intermediate outcomes reinforce dialogue in turn. Weakness at one stage (for example, infrequent dialogue) can weaken the other stages.

Ratner's (2012) Framework

Where Ansell and Gash are strong in explaining conditions and process, Ratner (2012) provides a more practical, stage-based lens for local development issues, in three stages:

1. Identifying obstacles and opportunities: actors jointly map the problems, constraints, and potential that exist;
2. Developing a shared strategy: actors debate and agree on the direction of action; and
3. Planning collaborative action: actors translate the strategy into plans, role divisions, and implementation commitments.

This framework guides the analysis toward two things this study needs, namely the obstacles to and opportunities for collaboration, and how collaboration moves from shared understanding to action.

Integrating Ansell-Gash and Ratner

The two frameworks complement each other: Ansell and Gash provide *explanatory dimensions*, while Ratner provides *stages of movement*. This study integrates them into a single analytical framework with three focus groups, as shown in Table 3 below:

Table 3. Ansell-Gash and Ratner Analytical Framework

Analytical focus	Dimensions (source)	Indicators for the shallot agropolitan case
A. Preconditions for collaboration	Starting conditions; institutional design; facilitative leadership (Ansell & Gash)	Imbalances in budget/human resources/information among actors; history of farmer–private sector–government relations; involvement of Gapoktan and the private sector in forums; clarity of rules and division of authority; Bappeda's role as coordinator

B. Collaborative process	Dialogue, trust, commitment, shared understanding, intermediate outcomes (Ansell & Gash); identification of obstacles and opportunities, shared strategy, action planning (Ratner)	Frequency and quality of meetings among actors; level of trust among farmers, government, and the private sector; shared views on the problem; presence or absence of a shared strategy and action plan
C. Collaboration outcomes	Intermediate and final outcomes; inhibiting and supporting factors	Changes in productivity, farmers' welfare, and the functioning of area facilities; constraints of time, information, human resources, facilities and infrastructure, and public awareness

Logic of the framework: Preconditions (A) shape the quality of the process (B), the process produces achievements (C), and achievements feed back into the starting conditions of subsequent collaboration. This flow also serves as the basis for formulating the research objectives and the interview guide.

Previous Studies and State of the Art

Several relevant studies have so far served as the knowledge map for this research. Three relevant previous studies are compared in terms of focus, context, approach, and findings, and then set against the position of this study, as shown in Table 4 below:

Table 4. Comparison with Prior Studies

No	Researchers	Focus and context	Approach/theory	Main findings	What has not been revealed
1	(Safarina N. et al., 2021)	Stakeholder collaboration in crystal guava agrotourism, Padang Village, Bojonegoro	Stakeholder collaboration (farmers, local government, local community)	Effective collaboration among parties is essential to the success of the initiative; success is influenced by communication, trust, and shared agreement	Agrotourism context, not agropolitan; has not systematically examined starting conditions, institutional design, and collaboration outcomes
2	(Maryani et al., 2023)	<i>Collaborative governance</i> in the PT TPPI CSR program "BANG JALI" (lemon agropolitan), Tasikharjo Village	<i>Collaborative governance</i> (community, village government, private sector)	The program ran as a collaborative process; it produced a village policy on using village land for the CSR program managed by the Sumber Rejeki Farmer Group	Focuses on one company's CSR program; does not address obstacles, capacity, and outcomes for farmers' welfare
3	(Haris et al., 2021)	Dynamics of <i>collaborative governance</i> in agropolitan development in Sumenep Regency during the <i>new normal</i> era	<i>Collaborative governance</i>	The collaboration is classified as self-managed, relying on the quality of principled engagement and shared motivation to build capacity for collective action (Haris et al., 2021)	Focuses on agropolitan in general during the <i>new normal</i> , not on shallots; has not examined relations among actors and outcomes at the farmer level

The position of this study can be seen in Table 5 below:

Table 5. Position of this Study

Aspect	Previous studies	This study
Focus	Collaborative process in general	Collaboration from starting conditions to <i>outcomes</i> , including obstacles, opportunities, and capacity
Commodity and location	Crystal guava (Bojonegoro), lemon (Tasikharjo), agropolitan in general (Sumenep)	Shallots, Rubaru District, Sumenep Regency
Theory	<i>Collaborative governance</i> in general	Integration of Ansell & Gash (2008) and Ratner (2012)
Time context	Including the <i>new normal</i> period	To date, shallot agropolitan development in Rubaru District involves Bappeda as coordinator, the Food Security and Agriculture Office as technical implementer, the Cooperatives, SMEs and Industry Office as supporter, 11 Gapoktan, the Rubaru Agricultural Extension Center (BPP), and the KUB PT Permata Indah Rubaru (Mukti, 2025). In 2024, the harvested area of shallots in Rubaru District ranged from 1,000 to 1,600 ha with production of 13–14 (BPS, 2025). However, coordination forums are not held regularly, facilities are not yet functioning, and farmer–private sector partnerships are not yet sustainable. This shows that the collaboration categorized as “self-managed” in earlier studies is not necessarily reflected in outcomes at the farmer level today.

Research Gap

These three studies suggest that collaboration among government, the private sector, and the community depends on the collaborative process used to achieve program goals. Previous studies focused more on the collaborative process itself and have not detailed the principles of collaboration. This gap is formulated into three gaps:

1. Gap in analytical depth: previous studies explain *that* collaboration occurs and what categories it falls into, but have not comprehensively analyzed the starting conditions (power/resource imbalances, incentives, history of antagonism and cooperation), institutional design, leadership, and process stages through to *outcomes*.
2. Context gap: agropolitan studies in Sumenep (Rillia et al., 2020) focus on agropolitan in general and on the *new normal* period, whereas collaboration on shallots in Rubaru District has not been studied.
3. Gap in obstacles, opportunities, and capacity: no study has explicitly identified the obstacles, opportunities, and capacity of collaboration and linked them to farmer outcomes.

Meanwhile, the novelty of this study lies in integrating the [Ansell and Gash \(2008\)](#) model with Ratner’s (2012) framework to analyze multi-actor collaboration in a shallot agropolitan area as a whole:

1. From upstream to downstream of collaboration: the analysis begins with starting conditions, institutional design, and leadership, continues to the collaborative process (face-to-face dialogue, commitment to the process, shared understanding, intermediate outcomes), and ends with *outcomes*.

2. Mapping obstacles and opportunities: identifying obstacles and opportunities, seeking solutions by mapping problem conditions, and assessing collaboration capacity, which earlier studies have not revealed.
3. Specific context: application to shallots in Rubaru District, Sumenep Regency, taking into account local social and cultural characteristics.

Thus, this study does not merely repeat existing collaboration research but deepens it from “whether collaboration occurs” to “how the quality of collaboration is formed, what its obstacles and opportunities are, and what its outcomes are”.

3. Research Methods

Research Design

This study uses a descriptive qualitative approach with a case study design to explain collaboration among stakeholders in developing a shallot agropolitan area from a collaborative governance perspective. A case study was chosen because it allows intensive, detailed, and in-depth information to be obtained about collaboration among actors (Baxter & Jack, 2015). This choice also reflects collaboration among actors as a contemporary, real-life phenomenon that attracts public attention (Fadli, 2021). This study examines collaboration in shallot agropolitan development in Rubaru District, Sumenep Regency. The analysis is based on two *collaborative governance* frameworks:

- a. Ansell and Gash (2008), with four dimensions: starting conditions, institutional design, leadership, and the collaborative process leading to *outcomes*.
- b. Ratner (2012), with stages of assessment and action planning, especially identifying obstacles and opportunities.

The study was carried out in five stages, as shown in Table 6 below:

Table 6. Stages in Qualitative Research

Stage	Activity
1	Deepening understanding of the problems of shallot agropolitan development and the existing institutions
2	Deepening understanding of the concept of <i>collaborative governance</i> as an approach to examining collaboration among stakeholders
3	Literature review and documentation related to shallot agropolitan and its theoretical relevance to <i>collaborative governance</i>
4	Interviews with relevant informants
5	<i>Focus group discussion</i> (FGD) to test the alignment of theoretical views and validate the data

Population, Sample, Participants, or Informants

Informants were selected through *purposive sampling* based on their direct involvement in the collaboration and their knowledge of shallot agropolitan development. The study included 15 informants, determined when the data reached saturation. Informants were grouped by element, as shown in Table 7 below:

Table 7. Informants in the Study

Element	Informants	Reason for selection
Regional government	Head of Bappeda; Head of the Food Security and Agriculture Office; representative of the Cooperatives, SMEs and Industry Office; extension team (Rubaru BPP)	Coordinator, technical implementer, and supporter of the area; knowledgeable about institutional design and policy
Private sector	Representative of the Cooperative/PT Permata Indah Rubaru (PIR)	Business actors and partnership
Community	Chair/representative of Gapoktan, landowners, middlemen, retailers	Production and trade actors; represent different interests, including possible conflicts of interest
Academics	Lecturers at Wiraraja University	Deepen the conceptual study of <i>collaborative governance</i>

The involvement of middlemen and retailers, in addition to Gapoktan, was intended to capture differences in trade interests that affect collaboration.

Data Source and Data Collection

a. Data sources

This study uses primary and secondary data. Primary data are obtained directly from the field through informants' statements and direct observations conducted at the research site. These data capture the perspectives, experiences, and actual conditions related to the phenomenon under study. Meanwhile, secondary data are collected from various relevant documents and supporting sources, including policy and planning documents such as Government Regulation No. 15 of 2010, Regional Regulation No. 12 of 2013 concerning the Sumenep Spatial Plan (RTRW), the Regional Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMD), and reports from relevant government agencies. Secondary data also include production data from the Central Statistics Agency (BPS) and the Agriculture Office, minutes or records of coordination meetings, and scientific literature related to the research topic. These secondary sources complement, verify, and contextualize the primary data obtained from the field.

Table 8. Data Collection Techniques, Procedures, and Data Sought

Technique	How it was carried out	Data sought
In-depth interviews	Semi-structured, using an interview guide developed from the Ansell-Gash and Ratner dimensions	Starting conditions, institutional design, leadership, collaborative process, obstacles, opportunities, and outcomes
Observation	Observation of coordination meetings, farmer group activities, area facilities, and trade activities	Interactions among actors and the physical condition of the area
Documentation	Review of documents and archives	Policy basis, programs, and achievements
FGD	Attended by researchers, informants, and academics (Krueger, 1998).	Test the alignment of views and validate the data

This study used several complementary techniques to obtain comprehensive and credible information on the phenomenon under investigation. The techniques included in-depth interviews, direct observation, documentation review, and focus group discussions (FGDs). Each technique captured different dimensions of the research problem, from actors' perceptions and experiences to actual interactions, institutional arrangements, policy frameworks, and program achievements. Using multiple data collection techniques also enabled the researchers to compare and cross-check information from different

sources, strengthening the validity of the research findings. The researchers conducted in-depth interviews using a semi-structured interview guide based on the analytical dimensions of Ansell and Gash and Ratner, while observations focused on actor interactions and field conditions. Documentation was used to examine relevant policies, programs, and achievements, while FGDs were conducted to assess the convergence of participants' perspectives and support data validation.

Data Analysis

Data were analyzed using the interactive model of Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña (2014), which runs during and after data collection, through the following stages (Miles et al., 2014) :

- a. Data collection from interviews, observation, and documentation.
- b. Data reduction (condensation): transcripts and notes are sorted, condensed, and coded according to the dimensions of the analytical framework (starting conditions, institutional design, leadership, collaborative process, *outcomes*, and obstacles and opportunities).
- c. Data are displayed in the form of narrative descriptions, matrices, and tables mapping actors and relations among actors.
- d. Conclusions are drawn and verified by comparing findings against the theoretical framework.

Interim results were then refined and deepened through the FGD. The analysis is deductively guided: initial codes derive from the theoretical dimensions, but new findings emerging from the field are still coded as additional themes.

Data Validity and Validity

The study maintained data validity through several complementary strategies. We conducted source triangulation by comparing information from different informant groups, including government representatives, private sector actors, farmers, middlemen, and academics. Technique triangulation involved cross-checking interview results with findings from direct observations and relevant documents. In addition, member checking through focus group discussions (FGDs) was used to confirm interim analysis results and examine consistency between informants' perspectives and the theoretical framework applied in the study. The study also maintained an audit trail by systematically preserving interview recordings, transcripts, and field notes as supporting evidence for the analytical process.

4. Results and Discussion

This study finds that the collaboration in shallot agropolitan development in Rubaru District was formally established through Regent's Decree No. 188/37/KEP/435.013/2011, but runs vertically and is centralized along the chain of the Agriculture Office–Rubaru BPP–Gapoktan. Marketing and processing actors (PT PIR, collectors/middlemen), the Cooperatives, SMEs and Industry Office, and academics have no shared forum with this chain. The empirical evidence includes:

- a. only 5 extension officers and 1 coordinator serve 11 villages;
- b. extension services and information reach only the chairs of farmer groups;
- c. infrastructure is provided only to legally registered farmer groups;
- d. Gapoktan do not yet have independent business units; and
- e. there is no routine coordination between Gapoktan and other stakeholders.

The interpretation is that the institutional design and leadership did not correct the resource imbalance in the starting conditions, so the collaborative process (dialogue, trust, commitment, shared understanding) stalled at intermediate outcomes and has not yet produced *outcomes* of welfare and self-reliance. This finding is consistent with Ansell and Gash's proposition that power and resource imbalances not offset by inclusiveness and facilitative leadership weaken the collaborative process (Ansell & Gash, 2008). In Ratner's framework, the stage of identifying obstacles is already underway, but has not been followed through into a shared strategy and joint action (Ratner, 2012).

Initial Conditions of Collaborative Governance in Shallot Agropolitan Development

The collaboration began with Regent's Decree No. 188/37/KEP/435.013/2011 on the working group for agropolitan area development. The decree aims to increase community income and welfare through rural-urban linkages and agribusiness that is competitive, community-based, and sustainable, and it serves as the technical basis for the Agriculture Office, the Rubaru BPP, and the Gapoktan Team. Two points should be noted. *First*, the decree was issued in 2011 and has not been revised, indicating that the basis for the collaboration has not kept pace with the area's development. *Second*, of the actors identified, the decree technically binds only three parties, so PT PIR and trade actors cooperate through a memorandum of understanding (MoU) and a Cooperation Agreement Letter (SPKS) between PIR and farmers.

Incentives in the collaboration are asymmetric. Extension officers receive incentives to ensure performance and engagement, whereas farmers receive incentives in the form of shallot seed. In the framework of Febrian (2015), incentives matter for welfare, but farmers' incentive is input assistance, not something that encourages initiative or independent enterprise (Febrian, 2015).

The history of relations among actors is marked by high interdependence: the community relies on government support, while the government needs Gapoktan as an intermediary to farmers. As an interview excerpt with the Gapoktan Chair puts it:

"As for the relationship between government and the community, the community in fact still very much needs support from the government. From production input assistance and mentoring to agricultural programs. The government itself cannot possibly deal directly with every farmer one by one, so Gapoktan becomes the link between the government and farmers. So there really is interdependence between the government, Gapoktan, and the community". (Interview with the Gapoktan Chair, August 10, 2025).

In addition, relations among actors can also be seen in the relationship among farmers, middlemen, and PT PIR. Farmers are often tied to middlemen because of limited farming capital and limited direct access to markets outside the region. Middlemen provide quick funds (loans) and act as the main buyer during peak harvest. PT PIR, meanwhile, acts as a standby buyer (off-taker) that absorbs the local Rubaru shallot variety directly from farmers. The company processes the raw material into value-added products such as fried shallots. The relationship among the three creates dual market channels. Middlemen continue to operate in the wet-market/traditional inter-city market niche, while PT PIR cuts through that channel by working with farmers to enter the downstream industrial market. This is consistent with an interview excerpt from a shallot farmer, Mr. Budiyanto:

"Farmers actually want to sell their harvest at a better price, but the problem is capital. When they need money for planting, fertilizer, pesticides, and other needs, farmers usually look for a quick loan."

Middlemen can give loans faster, but now there is PT PIR, which buys shallots from farmers, especially the local Rubaru shallot variety. So farmers do not sell only to middlemen. If the harvest meets the company's requirements, the shallots can be absorbed directly by PT PIR". (Interview with a Shallot Farmer, August 11, 2025).

Table 9 below shows that each actor holds different resources. Read from the standpoint of bargaining position, the imbalance appears as follows:

Table 9. Resource Distribution and Bargaining Power among Actors in the Collaboration

Actor	Resources controlled	Evidence from findings	Implications for bargaining position
Agriculture Office	Policy, budget, seed, equipment, infrastructure	Initiates socialization and training; infrastructure only for legal farmer groups	High: determines the agenda and who receives assistance
Rubaru BPP/PPL	Information, technical assistance	5 PPL and 1 coordinator for 11 villages; seed and price information received only by Gapoktan	High as gatekeeper of information access, but limited capacity
Gapoktan Team	Position as the official bridge	Acts on PPL direction; not yet independent and has no business unit	Medium: strong formally, dependent substantively
PT PIR	Labeled seed, facilities, market access	Unable to absorb the entire farmers' harvest	High in marketing: determines whose harvest is absorbed
Collectors/middlemen	Out-of-region market network	Buy harvests and cooperate with PT PIR; not part of the coordination forum	High in trade, but outside the collaboration mechanism
Farmers	Land and labor	Wait for direction; dependent on assistance; do not receive extension services directly	Lowest: program recipients, not decision-makers
Academics	Ideas	Intellectual contribution (serving as resource persons in training and research activities)	Low: does not control program resources

The table above shows that the stakeholders with the greatest resources to carry out shallot agro-politan development are the Agriculture Office, the Rubaru BPP, and the Gapoktan team. The community waits for direction from the Agriculture Office, the Rubaru BPP, and the Gapoktan team before taking action to implement the program. The community still needs guidance and training from the Agriculture Office, the Rubaru BPP, and the Gapoktan Team to build its capacity and resources. In addition, because PT PIR cannot yet absorb the entire harvest, farmers outside the partnership depend on buyers not covered by the collaboration mechanism, namely middlemen. This weakens farmers' bargaining position in price setting. This condition aligns with Ansell and Gash's (2008) indicators of imbalance: differences in capacity, organization, status, and resources that prevent some actors from participating on an equal footing (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Resources are concentrated in the Agriculture Office and extension officers, forming a pattern of government dominance and community dependence.

The selective choice of Gapoktan is intended to ensure commitment to the process, in line with Ansell and Gash (2008) principle of selecting committed actors. However, this selectivity has consequences for inclusiveness: infrastructure reaches only legally registered farmer groups, so farmers outside registered groups are not reached (Ansell & Gash, 2008). The design also does not yet involve PT PIR, middlemen, the Cooperatives and SMEs Office, and academics in a joint forum. The design thus meets the criteria of role clarity and commitment, but is weak on inclusiveness and joint decision-making

mechanisms. A conducive climate (Florini & Pauli, 2018) has not been fully achieved because services and information are not received equally.

Table 10. Institutional Design of Collaborative Governance in Shallot Agropolitan Development

Aspect	Findings
Basis of cooperation	Based on the 2011 Regent's Decree for the Agriculture Office, BPP, and Gapoktan; cooperation with PT PIR and middlemen is based on a closed-loop (upstream–downstream) partnership model
Division of roles	The Agriculture Office as facilitator (infrastructure, seed, sprayers, three-wheeled vehicles, carts, machinery); BPP as technical implementer and mentor (SLGAP, the Good Agricultural Practices Field School); Gapoktan as integrator of farmer groups (Poktan); PT PIR as facilitator of marketing and processing (fried shallots); middlemen as buyers
Collaborative forums	GAPOKTANDES (village level), GAPOKTANCAN (district level, on the 15th of each month), SLGAP; attended by the Agriculture Office, extension officers, and some farmer groups
Decision-making mechanism	<i>Top-down</i> : socialization and training are initiated by the Agriculture Office, and Gapoktan carries out PPL/BPP direction; Gapoktan are selected selectively by the government and BPP.

Identifying Obstacles and Opportunities During Collaborative Governance

Identifying obstacles is necessary to understand the problems stakeholders face in the collaborative governance of shallot agropolitan development. Identifying obstacles requires stakeholder openness so opportunities to overcome those problems or obstacles can emerge (Silviani & Eriyanti, 2023). The seventeen obstacles in Table 11 are grouped into four analytical categories. Frequency is calculated from the number of obstacle items in Table 10 and the number of actors who mentioned them.

Table 11. Classification of Barriers to Collaborative Governance

Category	Obstacles	Actors who mentioned them
Structural (policy and markets beyond the control of implementers)	Efforts to find investors have not materialized and there is no policy for them; PT PIR is not yet able to absorb the entire harvest; lack of collaboration with medium-to-large-scale processing investors; marketing strategy and networks are not yet appropriate	Agriculture Office, PT PIR
Institutional (rules, service distribution, oversight)	SLGAP is not yet evenly distributed; seed assistance is not monitored; infrastructure is only for legal farmer groups; insufficient post-assistance guidance, so group management stalls and no business units exist	Agriculture Office, Gapoktan
Resources (human resources, time, capacity)	Integrated farming system training is not yet optimal; only 5 extension officers and 1 coordinator; limited extension officers' time; Gapoktan's capacity to penetrate out-of-region markets; farmers' knowledge of cultivation and post-harvest handling	Agriculture Office, PPL, Gapoktan, Farmers
Participation (involvement and access to information)	Seed and price information reaches only Gapoktan; low farmer participation; dependence on assistance; low willingness to change and learn technology	PPL, Farmers

Resource obstacles are the most numerous and widespread, as four actors mentioned them. Structural obstacles lie beyond the control of field implementers, while institutional and participation obstacles reinforce each other: services that reach only legal groups and information that stops at group chairs produce passive farmers, and the government then reads that passivity as "low awareness." This

grouping also breaks down the five general obstacles in the initial draft (time, information, human resources, facilities and infrastructure, and awareness). The “facilities and infrastructure” obstacle in table 11 appears in the form of uneven distribution of infrastructure (institutional), not merely a shortage of physical facilities.

The opportunities found are: (1) the local Rubaru variety, which has been officially recognized through Minister of Agriculture Decree No. 2525/Kpts/SR.120/5/2011; (2) the use of marginal land, which accounts for about 27.36% of Rubaru’s agricultural land; (3) processed fried-shallot products with a wider market; (4) actors’ openness in voicing problems; and (5) the presence of academics as a source of ideas. In Ratner’s (2012) framework, stakeholders have voiced obstacles, but there is no problem map linking those obstacles to opportunities, and no way yet to assess the opportunities to overcome them. Obstacles are raised separately by each actor, not in a joint forum.

Leadership in Collaborative Governance

The Chair of the Gapoktan Team (Mr. Fauzan) is entrusted with implementation leadership. The chair is expected to bring stakeholders into collaboration and resolve conflicts, but the evidence shows this capacity has not yet formed:

- 1) Gapoktan has not yet built its capacity independently and cannot yet disseminate program information widely.
- 2) Its activities depend on the direction of the Rubaru BPP’s PPL, while DKPP initiates socialization and training.
- 3) Resolving obstacles still requires outside parties as facilitators.

The coordination pattern among actors indicates that collaboration is still predominantly organized through a vertical administrative structure. Coordination flows from the Agriculture Office to BPP/PPL, then to Gapoktan and the heads of farmer groups. Several coordination forums have been established, including GAPOKTANDES, GAPOKTANCAN, and SLGAP. However, these forums have not yet accommodated all relevant stakeholders, particularly market actors, supporting agencies, academics, and farmer groups that are inactive or do not yet have legal status. As a result, the existing coordination mechanism remains limited in integrating production, marketing, institutional, and investment-related interests. Table 12 presents an overview of these coordination conditions.

Table 12. Coordination Patterns and Stakeholder Involvement in the Collaborative Process

Aspect	Condition
Existing coordination	Vertical: Agriculture Office to BPP/PPL to Gapoktan to Poktan chairs
Available forums	GAPOKTANDES, GAPOKTANCAN (monthly), SLGAP
Actors not included	PT PIR, collectors/middlemen/retailers, Cooperatives and SMEs Office, academics, inactive or non-legal farmer groups
Horizontal coordination	No routine coordination between Gapoktan and other stakeholders
Consequences	Problems of marketing, harvest absorption, and processing investment (structural obstacles) have no forum for resolution; conflicts require external facilitators; no shared problem map is formed

Theoretically, facilitative leadership requires leaders who manage the process, build trust, and empower weaker actors. Leadership in the field still acts as an extension of government direction, and so does not yet perform these functions.

Discussion

Collaborative governance follows the collaborative process carried out by stakeholders in implementing shallot agropolitan development. Stakeholders work together to achieve the outcomes that are the goal of shallot agropolitan development. The collaborative process consists of face-to-face dialogue, trust-building, commitment to the process, and intermediate outcomes (Ansell & Gash, 2008).

Face-to-face dialogue. Regular meetings are held every month (GAPOKTANDES and GAPOKTAN-CAN on the 15th of each month). Dialogue runs intensively along the Agriculture Office–extension officers–Gapoktan chain, but is limited to its participants: the Agriculture Office, extension officers, and some farmer groups. Groups that are inactive in communicating with the government are not treated equally.

Trust. The community complains that monthly extension sessions are given only to a few representative farmers, who then pass the information on to other members. Some farmers ignore it. As an interview excerpt from a shallot farmer, Mr. Ahmad, puts it:

"As for extension sessions, usually only certain people attend, such as the group chair or a few designated members. Later the results of the session are conveyed to the other farmers. But some farmers do not really care, because they feel they already have their own farming experience. So the information from the extension sessions is sometimes not all applied." (Interview with a shallot farmer, August 11, 2025).

This pattern shows that trust in the government is uneven and that some farmers feel outside the information network.

Commitment. Commitment was formally established through the 2011 Regent's Decree, and the Gapoktan Team feels bound and responsible. Communication and mentoring apply only to Gapoktan, while less active groups do not receive similar treatment. The commitment formed is therefore one-sided and has not yet become shared.

Shared understanding. Shared understanding has not been achieved. Socialization and mentoring by the Agriculture Office and extension officers reach only Gapoktan, not all farmers. The evidence: (a) seed and price information is received only by Gapoktan; (b) farmers' knowledge of planting and post-harvest handling is low; (c) farmer participation in program activities is low; (d) marketing actors (PT PIR, middlemen) are not in the same dialogue as cultivation extension, so the strategic direction, vision, and collaborative values are not yet shared.

The collaborative process has generated several intermediate outcomes, evident in institutional, economic, capacity-building, and land-use achievements. These outcomes reflect the initial results of interactions among government agencies, extension actors, farmer organizations, and other stakeholders involved in shallot agropolitan development in Rubaru. Although these achievements do not yet indicate full realization of collaborative goals, they represent measurable progress and provide evidence of incremental benefits from ongoing collaboration. Table 13 summarizes the main intermediate outcomes identified in the study.

Based on the table above, the "small wins" in implementing shallot agropolitan development are that the local Rubaru shallot variety has been officially recognized through a Minister of Agriculture Decree (No. 2525/Kpts/SR.120/5/2011) because of its resilience to extreme weather and high rainfall, and that the Sumenep Regency Government won an award from the East Java Provincial Government for successfully using marginal land (about 27.36% of Rubaru's total agricultural area) for shallot cultivation, with a planted area reaching thousands of hectares. Such achievements can motivate further accomplishment and the realization of a self-reliant community

Table 13. Intermediate Outcomes and Measurable Achievements of Shallot Agropolitan Development

Dimension	Achievement
Institutional	Official recognition of the local Rubaru shallot variety (Minister of Agriculture Decree No. 2525/Kpts/SR.120/5/2011)
Land use	Utilization of marginal land, $\pm 27.36\%$ of Rubaru's agricultural land, with a planted area of 1,198 hectares; award from the East Java Provincial Government
Market access	Processed products (fried shallots) and export partnerships
Price	Selling price of about IDR 24,000/kg for the local variety
Capacity	SLGAP training and harvest-processing training
Productivity	Average of 7.158 tons/hectare
Farmer institutions	Poktan in 11 villages integrated into Gapoktan

In addition to the small wins in intermediate outcomes, implementing collaborative governance in shallot agropolitan development has also produced interim results. These interim results take the form of derivative products (such as processed fried shallots and export partnerships) that have successfully entered overseas markets and have been recognized through various Islamic boarding school (santri) entrepreneurship programs and farmer-group innovations. In addition, the high selling price of about IDR 24,000 per kilogram enables the local Rubaru shallot variety to bring profit to farmers in Sumenep Regency.

Table 14. Assessment of Welfare and Community Self-Reliance Outcomes in Shallot Agropolitan Development

Concept	Indicator	Current condition (evidence)	Assessment
Welfare	Farm income	According to local farmers' records, with capital of around IDR 10,000,000, farmers can earn gross income of around IDR 40,000,000 to IDR 50,000,000 per harvest	Depends on the peak harvest season or the off-season
	Selling price compared with cost	Selling price of IDR 24,000/kg, production cost of IDR 21,500 to IDR 22,295 per kilogram	<i>A relatively thin to moderate markup (about 10% to 20% depending on sorting/grading quality)</i>
Self-reliance	Market access and harvest absorption	PT PIR is not yet able to absorb the entire harvest	Not yet achieved
	Dependence on government assistance	Farmers act on the basis of government support; dependence on assistance	Not yet achieved
	Group capacity and business units	Gapoktan do not yet have independent business units; management stalls after assistance ends	Not yet achieved
	Knowledge and technology adoption	Knowledge of cultivation and post-harvest handling is low; low willingness to change	Not yet achieved
	Ability to solve problems independently	Problem solving still requires external facilitators	Not yet achieved
	Participation	Farmer participation is low; services reach only group chairs	Not yet achieved

The ultimate outcomes expected from implementing shallot agropolitan development are a prosperous and self-reliant community. In this study, these outcomes are assessed through measurable indicators that reflect both economic welfare and the community's capacity for independent action. Welfare

is examined through farmers' income, the relationship between selling prices and production costs, and the extent of market access and harvest absorption. Meanwhile, self-reliance is assessed through farmers' dependence on government assistance, the institutional and business capacity of farmer groups, knowledge and technology adoption, the ability to solve problems independently, and the level of farmer participation. Table 14 presents the current condition of each indicator, along with the corresponding assessment of outcome achievement.

All self-reliance indicators show conditions that have not yet been achieved, and the welfare indicators do not yet show an improvement that can be demonstrated in measurable terms. Positive achievements (the local variety, use of marginal land, fried shallots, selling price) do exist, but their benefits are so far felt only by some farmers, especially those in active farmer-group networks and in the PT PIR partnership. The evidence supports the conclusion that *outcomes* have not been achieved at three levels: process (shared understanding has not formed), capacity (Gapoktan is not yet independent), and results (market absorption and income have not measurably improved).

Implication for The Model

The study results show that the lack of successful long-term outcomes for shallot agropolitan development stems from multiple constraints in the collaborative governance process. Different initial conditions among actors lead to power imbalances related to access to information and other resources. Institutional weaknesses, including inadequate stakeholder participation by marketing actors, processors, harvesters, and other community groups lacking official recognition, exacerbate these power imbalances. Other institutional weaknesses include a heavy reliance on outside facilitators for collaborative leadership and a lack of institutional capacity within Gapoktan to provide collaborative leadership and help resolve conflicts among participants. These institutional weaknesses prevent participants from building on intermediate outcomes to achieve other community goals, such as greater economic independence.

The results indicate that outputs from current collaboration include some recognition of local shallot varieties and other institutional improvements, as well as progress in land use and shallot cultivation and related training and farmer organization efforts. Limitations of current outputs include a focus on production-related outputs and a lack of commercial and other institutional benefits. Other challenges include barriers to marketing and other investments and unequal access to information and other resources among farmers, as well as reliance on government support. Issues to address include ways to help farmers benefit from current collaborative efforts in the long term.

Based on these results, a new collaborative governance approach should be implemented to improve links between production and marketing-related institutions. Specifically, additional marketing and processing stakeholders should be included in the collaborative governance process. Other key stakeholders to consider including are PT PIR, middlemen, retailers, other processing firms, government agencies, and other possible marketing-related stakeholders. Including these other stakeholders is important because many barriers to the industry are not in the production area. Adding these other stakeholders will help expand the focus of collaborative efforts from production to broader production and marketing efforts.

Second, the collaborative forum should create a joint problem analysis to guide joint planning and action. Ratner (2012) recommends a joint problem analysis process as part of collaborative planning to help stakeholders reach agreement about shared problems and solutions. A joint problem analysis

in this situation could help stakeholders better understand the relationships among production, market access, marketing, processing, infrastructure, investment, and other issues related to farmer participation. Advantages of a joint problem analysis include reduced competition among different groups to address these problems separately.

Third, institutional support for Gapoktan should be provided to help it transition from an administrative role to one of facilitative leadership in the farming process. Institutional support activities might include training in organizational management, conflict resolution, communication, marketing, and other areas. Rather than simply increasing Gapoktan's administrative role, these activities aim to help Gapoktan develop the ability to link small farmers with other institutions and individuals on its own. Over time, this transfer of facilitative leadership from outside institutions to local institutions may occur.

The model suggests that multiple approaches are needed to ensure sustainable outcomes and link intermediate outcomes to long-term goals. Approaches include incentives and other strategies to engage farmers and other producers in sustainable activities; strategies to increase inclusion of farmers and other groups who are not formally affiliated with institutions; a production and marketing forum to coordinate production and marketing issues; and knowledge transfer from project staff to Gapoktan. These strategies can help improve long-term outcomes, including better welfare for farmers, institutional independence, and decreased reliance on government support by farmers and their communities.

Therefore, the model's contribution is expanding the collaborative governance framework to include other variables in addition to initial conditions, institutional and leadership arrangements, and collaborative activities as determinants of collaborative outcomes. The study results show that other factors affecting collaborative outcomes include intervening variables that connect collaborative activities and outputs. For shallot agropolitan development in Sumenep Regency, these intervening variables include market access and other outreach efforts, expanded public participation in defining problems, and efforts to develop local leaders. Key contributions of the model include lessons learned in this study.

5. Conclusion

This study concludes that *collaborative governance* in shallot agropolitan development in Sumenep Regency has been formally established, but has not achieved *outcomes* in the form of a prosperous and self-reliant community because it runs in a centralized and non-inclusive manner. This conclusion is elaborated according to the research objectives. *First*, starting conditions, institutional design, and leadership. The collaboration is based on Regent's Decree No. 188/37/KEP/435.013/2011 and began from unequal conditions: resources, policy, and information are concentrated in the Agriculture Office and the BPP, while farmers receive incentives in the form of input assistance. The institutional design is top-down through Gapoktan as the single intermediary, so extension services stop at group chairs and infrastructure reaches only legal farmer groups. Gapoktan leadership still depends on extension officers and outside facilitators. *Second*, the collaborative process. Coordination runs vertically (Agriculture Office, BPP, Gapoktan), while PT PIR, collectors/middlemen, the Cooperatives and SMEs Office, and academics are not in a joint forum. Trust is uneven, and shared understanding has not been achieved because information does not reach all farmers. Obstacles have been voiced by each actor, but have not been mapped into a shared strategy. *Third*, outcomes, obstacles, and opportunities. Interim results include a recognized local variety, use of marginal land, and processed fried-shallot products. However, Gapoktan still lacks independent business units, relies heavily on assistance, and has inadequate harvest absorption. Theoretical contribution.

This study integrates the Ansell and Gash model with Ratner's framework and then extends it into the *Conversion Collaborative Governance Model*. The model shows that intermediate outcomes do not automatically become *outcomes*, that inclusiveness needs to be assessed down to the final recipient, that the production and market arenas need to be connected, and that the type of incentives and the pattern of leadership determine whether initial imbalances persist. This contribution is a contextual extension, not a new theory.

Limitations and directions for future research. This single-case study in Rubaru District uses qualitative data from [number] informants, is not supplemented with quantitative data (NTP, income, productivity), and cannot yet establish the causal relationship between collaboration and achievements. The four conversion mechanisms in the model have also not been tested empirically. Future research should test the model in other areas or commodities, use a *mixed-methods* design with quantitative data, trace changes longitudinally, and explore the perspectives of non-legal farmers and market actors.

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